## Type-Based Verification of Delegated Control in Hybrid Systems

# Eduard Kamburjan<sup>1</sup>

 $Michael\ Lienhardt^2$ 

 $^{1}\mbox{University of Oslo}$ 

<sup>2</sup>ONERA

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#### Modern Cyber-Physical Systems require Distributed Control and Cloud Systems

- Edge devices in IoT
- Digital Twins and Industry 4.0
- Networked devices, e.g., autonomous trains







Engineers can build these devices – but how do we verify them? CPS verification, program verification and cloud modeling barely intersect.

# **Modeling - Hybrid Active Objects**

# HABS: Hybrid ABS



#### Abstract Behavioral Specification

(1) Modeling, (2) Specification and Verification, and (3) Simulation of Modular Systems with Active Objects.

# HABS: Hybrid ABS



#### Abstract Behavioral Specification

(1) Modeling, (2) Specification and Verification, and (3) Simulation of Modular Hybrid Systems with Active Objects.

 $\textbf{Hybrid Active Objects} = \quad \text{objects}$ 

+ actor concurrency model


+ condition synchronization

+ explicit time


+ continuous behavior

## **Example: Water Tank**





```
class CSingleTank(Real inVal){
    physical{
        Real lvl = inVal : lvl' = flow;
        Real flow = -0.5 : flow' = 0;
    { this!low(); }
    Unit low(){
        await diff lv1 <= 3 & flow <= 0;
        flow = 0.5; this!up();
    Unit up(){
        await diff lvl >= 10 & flow >= 0;
        flow = -0.5: this!low():
```



# **Object Invariants**




#### Proof Obligations with Dynamic Logic

In discrete systems, an object invariant I can be checked modularly with dynamic logic by showing that every method preserves I.

$$I \rightarrow [s]I$$

Proof Obligation for Discrete Systems



First, we need a logic for hybrid systems.

# **Object Invariants**




#### Proof Obligations with Dynamic Logic

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Proof Obligation for Discrete Systems



First, we need a logic for hybrid systems.

# **Differential Dynamic Logic**



#### Differential Dynamic Logic

A logic for (algebraic) hybrid programs:

$$\phi ::= \forall x. \ \phi \mid \phi \lor \phi \mid \neg \phi \mid \ldots \mid [\alpha] \phi$$

$$\alpha ::= ?\phi \mid \mathtt{v} := \mathtt{t} \mid \mathtt{v} := \ast \mid \{\mathtt{v}' = f(\mathtt{v}) \& \phi\} \mid \ldots$$

# **Differential Dynamic Logic**



#### Differential Dynamic Logic

A logic for (algebraic) hybrid programs:

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$$\alpha ::= ?\phi \mid v := t \mid v := * \mid \{v' = f(v) \& \phi\} \mid \dots$$

#### Example

Set a variable to 0, let it raise with slope 1 while it is below 5 and discard all runs where it is above 5.

$$[x := 0; \{x' = 1\&x \le 5\}; ?x \ge 5]x \doteq 5$$

This formula is valid.



#### **Preliminaries**

- We assume that every method starts with an await diff statement.
   If it does not, add await diff true.
- The leading guard of a method m is denoted  $trig_m$ .
- Only Real variables are manipulated.
- Weak negation is denoted  $\tilde{\neg}e_1 \geq e_2 \iff e_1 \leq e_2$

#### Safety

An object is safe w.r.t. some formula  $\phi$ , if its state is a model for  $\phi$ 

(a) whenever a method starts and (b) whenever time advances.

For the beginning, we assume that all await are leading and no get or duration occur.

## **Basic Regions**




#### Theorem

Let C be a class with dynamics ode. Each object of C is safe w.r.t. inv and precondition pre if for every method the following holds:

$$\mathsf{inv} \to \big[ ? \mathit{trig}_{\mathtt{m}}; \mathsf{trans}(\mathtt{s}_{\mathtt{m}}) \big] \big( \mathsf{inv} \wedge [\mathsf{ode\&true}] \mathsf{inv} \big)$$

And additionally for the constructor:

$$\mathsf{pre} \to \big[\mathsf{trans}(\mathtt{s}_{\mathtt{init}})\big] \big(\mathsf{inv} \land [\mathsf{ode\&true}]\mathsf{inv}\big)$$



## **Basic Regions**



#### Lemma

Let C be safe w.r.t. inv. Let  $C^+$  be C with an added method and  $C^-$  be C with a method removed.

- C<sup>−</sup> is safe
- To show safety of C<sup>+</sup>, only the new method must be verified
- Very modular
- Imprecise: do not use additional information provided the structure
- Cannot verify our water tank
- Can verify self-stabilizing systems without control cycle




#### Theorem

Let C be a class with dynamics ode. For each method m let  $\mathsf{CM}_n$  be the set of methods which are guaranteed to called in every execution. Each object of C is safe w.r.t. inv if for every method m the following holds:

$$\mathsf{inv} \to [?\mathit{trig}_{\mathtt{m}}; \mathsf{trans}(\mathtt{s}_{\mathtt{m}})] \left( \mathsf{inv} \land \left[ \mathsf{ode\&} \bigwedge_{\mathtt{m'} \in \mathsf{CM}_{\mathtt{m}}} \tilde{\neg} \mathit{trig}_{\mathtt{m'}} \right] \mathsf{inv} \right)$$

And analogously for the constructor.





```
class LocalTank(){
physical{Real lvl = 5 : lvl' = flow; Real flow = -0.5 : ...}
{ this!low(); }
Unit low(){await diff lvl <= 3; flow = 0.5; this!up();}
Unit up(){await diff lvl >= 10; flow = -0.5; this!low();}
}
```

```
\mathsf{inv} \rightarrow \texttt{[?lvl <= 3;flow := 0.5]} \big(\mathsf{inv} \land \texttt{[lvl' = flow\&lvl <= 10]} \mathsf{inv}\big)
```



```
class LocalTank(){
  physical{Real lvl = 5 : lvl' = flow; Real flow = -0.5 : ...}
  { this!timed(); }
  Unit timed(){
      await duration(1,1);
      if(1v1 >= 9.5) -flow = 0.5;
      if(1v1 \le 3.5) flow = 0.5;
      this!timed();
```



```
class LocalTank(){
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```

What about systems that decouple control and dynamics?

#### **Limitations - External Control**



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Need to consider other objects to compute post-regions – is the tank controlled?

```
class Controller(){
  Unit timer(Tank t, Int time){
   await duration(1);
  if(time != 0) {
    t!localCtrl();
   this.timer(t, time - 1);}}}
```

#### **Limitations - External Control**



Need to consider other objects to compute post-regions – is there always one controller?

```
class Mobile {
  Unit run() {
   Tank t = new Tank(4);
   Controller c = new localCtrl(); Fut<Unit> f = c.timer(t, 40);
  await duration(40) & f;
  c = new Controller(); f = c.timer(t, -1); }}
```



#### Subtle timing issues can violate specification

```
class Controller(){
 Unit timer(Tank t, Int time){
    await duration(1);
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     t!localCtrl():
      this.timer(t. time - 1):}}
class Mobile {
Unit run() {
 Tank t = new Tank(4):
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 Tank t = new Tank(4):
 Controller c = new localCtrl(): Fut<Unit> f = c.timer(t, 40);
 await duration (40) & f:
 c = new Controller(); f = c.timer(t, -1); }}
```



# **Type-Checking External Control**



#### Challenge

- Post-region cannot be computed locally
- External control must be globally ensured
- Obligation for external control can be delegated

#### **Overview Solution**

- Controllee gets specification: Temporal, externally controlled post-region (ECP)
- Controller gets specification: controlled objects
- Type system checks
  - For every object with an ECP there is always a controller
  - Each controller respects the ECP specification of its controllee
- From the controllee-view, post-region-based verification is unchanged

## **ECP Specification**



```
class Tank(Real inVal){
                                  /*@ requires 3.5 <=inVal<= 9.5 @*/
physical{ Real lvl' = flow; ...} /*@ invariant 3 <= lvl <= 10 \&\& -0.5 <= flow <= 0.5 @*/
/*@ timed requires 1 @*/
Unit localCtrl(){
 if(1v1 \le 3.5) flow = 0.5:
 if(1v1 >= 9.5) flow = -0.5:}
class Controller(){
/*@ time control: t.localCtrl = [1, 1] @*/
Unit timer(Tank t, Int time){
```

- timed\_requires specifies the period of repeated calls to this method
- timed\_control p.m= [a,b] specifies what the method periodically calls
  - Periodic call to p.m with some ECP, where p is a parameter and thus invariant
  - The first time after a time units
  - After the last call, b time units remain until it must be called again

# Sketch Type Analysis



#### **ECP** Analysis

#### Three step analysis

- Run a global time analysis, derive for each statement how much time it may require to execute it (non-modular, lightweight)
- Run type system, to make sure ECP are called correctly (non-modular, lightweight)
- Generate and verify all proof obligations with ddL/KeYmaera X (modular, heavyweight)

Type system operates on the level of locations.

- A ceid is a pair of location and method (e.g. p,m). Idea:
- Keep track of all ceid's and when it must be called again during type checking
- Update maximal time left for each ceid's to be called
- Check that this time is always positive
- Delegation only through method calls, i.e., tree like structure



$$\Gamma_l, \Gamma_d \vdash s : \Gamma'_l, \Gamma'_d$$

- $\Gamma_I$  registers the ceid's that the method under analysis must control, maps to a number
- $\Gamma_d$  registers the ceid's that we delegated control to and maps them to  $(fid, t_{min}, t_{max}, t)$ : Future fid, how long they control  $t_{min}, t_{max}$  and when control must be called afterwards t

Rule for time a	dvance without calls (simplified)	



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$$TA(s) = [t^-, t^+]$$
  $C = \{i \mid i \in I \land t^i_{min} - t^+ < 0\}$ 

$$\Gamma_I, \left[ \mathtt{ceid}_i \mapsto \left( \mathit{fid}^i, t^i_{\mathit{min}}, t^i_{\mathit{max}}, t^i \right) \right]_{i \in I} \vdash \mathtt{s} :$$



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- Rule for method calls is responsible for two things:
  - If one delegates control, move ceid from  $\Gamma_I$  to  $\Gamma_d$
  - If the method has a ECP, update  $\Gamma_I$
- When object is created, all its methods with ECP are added to  $\Gamma_I$
- Full system needs context-awareness and some other rules (see paper)

Rule for calls (simplified)				
·				



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$$\Gamma_I, \Gamma_d \vdash e_1! m(e_2, \ldots, e_n)$$



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
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
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# **Cloud System**



- Type system works for Timed ABS
- If model can be separated into timed control structure and hybrid, HABS can be used
- Cyber-physical systems are only at the edge!





#### Conclusion



#### Summary

- Post-regions for external control
- Type system ensures that control structures respect timing constraints
- Modular in time-analysis
- Modularity of deductive verification preserved

#### Future Work

- Implementation
- Beyond tree structured delegation
- Further post-region patterns

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Thank you for your attention