# Deductive Verification of Active Objects with Crowbar

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## Abstract

We present Crowbar, a deductive verification tool for the Active Object language ABS. Crowbar implements novel specification approaches specifically for distributed systems. For user interaction, counterexamples are presented as executable programs. Crowbar has a modular structure to explore further approaches, and was applied in the largest Active Objects verification study.

Keywords: Deductive Verification, Symbolic Execution, Active Objects

## 1 1. Introduction

Deductive verification of functional properties is a static analysis tech-2 nique that uses *program logics* to verify the behavior of programs against user-provided specification. Provers implementing such program logics, for example the KeY [1] prover, have been successfully used to detect bugs in welltested libraries [2, 3] for sequential programs. KeY implements heavyweight 6 symbolic execution (SE), where the program is transformed into first-order formulas by keeping track of symbolic values throughout program execution. 8 Heavyweight symbolic execution is able to deal with unbounded systems by 9 additional user-provided specification, for example through additional invari-10 ants that have to be preserved by loops. 11

For distributed systems, more complex specification languages than for sequential programs are needed. The specific concurrency model plays a major role in the design of specification languages and program logics, and in this work we present a heavyweight symbolic execution tool for Active Objects.

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Active Objects [4] are an object-oriented, actor-based concurrency model for 16 distributed systems, developed specifically with a focus on analyzability and 17 implemented in the ABS language [5]. ABS has been applied as a modeling tool 18 to a multitude of domains, ranging from cloud systems [6, 7, 8, 9], over rail-19 way operations [10] and memory systems [11] to computational biology [12]. 20 A prototypical extension of KeY, KeY-ABS [13], showed that the general 21 ideas of heavyweight symbolic execution indeed carry over to ABS [14]. How-22 ever, new specification approaches [15, 16, 17], program logics [18, 19], inte-23 gration with static analyses [20] and further case studies [21] have revealed 24 that the structure of KeY with its tight integration of Java-specifics is not 25 suited to handle (a) the specification languages needed for Active Objects 26 and (b) parts of the ABS language that clash with Java specifics. For exam-27 ple, the functional sublanguage of ABS, exceptions and method contracts are 28 not supported. Consequently, KeY-ABS supports only object invariants and a 20 small subset of ABS – namely the one which has similar semantics to Java. 30

Crowbar is the an alternative system, implemented from scratch and 31 based on the Behavioral Program Logic (BPL) [18]. It covers full coreABS<sup>1</sup>. 32 delegates part of the proof obligation to external static analyses and uses the 33 newly developed specification approaches for Active Objects, such as coop-34 erative contracts [17]. Crowbar is not interactive, i.e., the user cannot see 35 the proof in the program logic. To realize feedback, it instead integrates a 36 counterexample generation that presents failed proof branches completely in 37 terms of the program: the counterexample is output as an ABS program that 38 is executable and contains only the statements needed to reproduce a run 30 described by the failed proof branch. Thus, the user is not exposed to the 40 underlying program logic. To accommodate the need for quick prototyping 41 of new specification approaches, Crowbar has a modular structure suited for 42 prototypical exploration of novel approaches: it is easy to add new BPL 43 calculi. Crowbar was used for the biggest Active Object verification case 44 study [22], that goes beyond the capabilities of prior systems in (1) language 45 coverage, (2) complexity of specification, and (3) lines of code. 46

Targeted Problem.. Crowbar can verify functional properties of Active Objects specified by cooperative method contracts [17] and local session types for
Active Objects [15], both formalized in the Behavioral Program Logic [18]. It
implements delegating parts of the proof obligation to external static analy-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>ABS without its extensions for, e.g., timed models.

ses and has a modular structure that enables easy extendability to implement
further behavioral specifications, which we describe in more details below.

Structure. This article is structured as follows. Sec. 2 introduces Active 53 Objects, ABS, the used specification languages, symbolic execution and gives 54 an example. Sec. 3 describes the structure of Crowbar. Sec. 4 describes the 55 implementation in more detail, the aforementioned case study and compares 56 Crowbar with KeY-ABS and other related tools. Sec. 5 gives an example of the 57 usage of **Crowbar** and the counterexample generator before Sec. 6 concludes. 58 For the technical documentation we refer to the documentation of Crowbar 59 at https://github.com/Edkamb/crowbar-tool/wiki, the theoretical back-60 ground is referred to in the corresponding parts of Sec. 2. 61

## 62 2. Background

To verify the safety of a program one must specify its expected behavior and translate the specified program into a set of *proof obligations*. If all proof obligations can be discharged, then the program is *safe*, where under safety we understand (local) partial correctness [23]: if every process terminates, then the program behaves as specified and no process throws an exception.

For distributed systems, with their inherit non-determinism, it is crucial 68 that the specification is *modular*. This means that changes in one part of 69 the program should not invalidate all proof obligations. Thus, the design of 70 specification techniques is a balancing act between strong abstraction with 71 high modularity and weak abstraction with high expressive power [5]. ABS 72 and Crowbar are specifically designed to explore this trade-off by integrating 73 different approaches in one system to compare them in practice. Crowbar is 74 also modular in its approach to integration and allows to interact with type 75 systems and static analyses. 76

## 77 2.1. Active Objects and ABS

Active Objects are an actor-based, object-oriented concurrency model which realizes strong encapsulation. At its core, an Active Object program consists of a set of objects, which communicate with each other using asynthronous method calls, and futures to retrieve the return value of a method call. In each object, at most one process is active at any time, meaning that there is no interleaving within an objects. The objects are preemption-free: <sup>84</sup> a process must explicitly deschedule itself before another can become active.

- <sup>85</sup> Objects can be created at runtime.
- <sup>86</sup> In more details, it is based on the following features for concurrency:
- Strong Encapsulation. Every object is strongly encapsulated at runtime,
   such that no other object can access its fields, not even objects of the
   same class.
- Asynchronous Calls with Futures. Each method call to another object
   is asynchronous and generates a future. Futures can be passed around
   and are used to synchronize on the process generated by the call. Once
   the called process terminates, its future is *resolved* and the return value
   can be retrieved. We say that the process *computes* its future.
- Cooperative Scheduling. At every point in time, at most one process is
   active per object and a running process cannot be interrupted unless it
   *explicitly* releases the object. This is done either by termination with a
   return statement or with an await g statement that waits until guard g
   holds. A guard polls whether a future is resolved or whether a boolean
   condition holds.
- Concurrent systems are challenging for SE, but Active Objects allow to perform *local* SE on single methods through their strong encapsulation and decoupling of caller and callee processes. Special care, however, has to be taken to keep track of futures and correct handling of state when using **await**. We introduce the ABS language using an example to demonstrate these features.
- ABS. The Abstract Behavioral Specification language (ABS) is an implemen-106 tation of Active Objects with a rich toolkit of static analyses. It supports 107 extensions of Active Objects such as product lines [24], timed [25], hybrid [26], 108 resource [27] models or open systems [28]. The fragment which only imple-109 ments the core Active Objects features is referred to as coreABS. Crowbar 110 only supports  $coreABS^2$ . Beyond the object-oriented language, ABS has a sim-111 ple (no function passing) functional sublanguage for data processing. For a 112 detailed tutorial we refer to the online material of  $ABS^3$ . 113

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>It also supports product lines in the sense that after a variant is generated, Crowbar can verify it. It does not perform a family-based analysis [29].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>http://abs-models.org

## 114 2.2. Specification

Specification of Active Objects must take concurrency into account, even 115 method contracts require special attention due to, among others, the time gap 116 between calling a method and starting its execution. For **Crowbar** we support 117 state object invariants, behavioral method contracts and local session types. 118 Crowbar specifications are part of the input ABS file using Spec-annotations: 119 Each ABS statement and definition  $\mathbf{s}$  can be prefixed with an annotation 120 using the [T: e]s syntax, where T is a type and e an expression. Spec defines 121 the data type for specifications, which must be provided as the expression 122 of the annotation. Spec-annotations are ignored at runtime. Additionally, 123 loops are annotated with loop invariants using WhileInv. 124

Behavioral Method Contracts. A method can be annotated with Ensures and Requires as post and preconditions. In interfaces, these specifications can only contain parameters (and result, the special variable for the return value). For an example, we refer to Fig. 1.

Following the principles behind the Java Modeling Language (JML) [30], 129 Crowbar supports old to refer to the pre-state of the method and last to 130 refer to the pre-state of the last suspension, i.e., the state before the last 131 await statement was executed, or the pre-state of the method if no await was 132 executed yet. Additionally, Crowbar supports the post and preconditions 133 at await suspension statements, as well as Succeeds and Overlaps context 134 sets [17]: if the precondition of a method contains assertions about the heap, 135 then it is not clear which method is responsible to establish it — due to 136 the concurrency model, the caller has no control over the fields of the callee 137 object. Context sets specify for a method m the following: the methods in 138 Succeeds must have run and must establish the precondition as their post-139 condition. The methods in Overlaps may have run and must preserve the 140 precondition. 141

Object Invariants. Objects are annotated with creation conditions (Requires
and object invariants (ObjInv). A creation condition describes the parameters of the constructor (analogously to asynchronous contracts), while the
object invariant has to hold after the constructor terminate and whenever a
process is scheduled or descheduled.

Local Session Types. Lastly, Crowbar supports a variant of local session types. A local session type for ABS is represented as a string and specifies calls, synchronization, sequence, repetition and alternative. Alternative is specified using +, repetition with \*, suspension with  $\text{Susp}(\varphi)$  (where  $\varphi$  specifies the state before suspension, and analogously for calls !) and synchronization with Get(e), where e is the targeted expression. Session types specify how *roles* in a protocol communicate. The mapping of roles to fields is specified with [Spec: Role("name",this.field)]. For details we refer to [18, 31, 15].

For example, the following expresses that the statement **s** first calls method **m** on role **f** and then **n** on role **g**. Finally, the last action is a **return** in a state where **result** == 0 holds (i.e., the return value is zero). No other communication, synchronization or suspension happens. This is annotated using [Spec: Local("f!m.g!n.Put(result == 0)")]. The systems are independent: it is not necessary to specify a local type.

#### 161 2.3. Examples

*Example Contracts and Invariants.* We give a short example on ABS and its
specification below. For brevity's sake, we only give asynchronous method
contracts and the object invariant.

Consider Lst. 1. The class Monitor has two fields: s which is a server that 165 is monitored and beats, a counter for successful requests to s. The method 166 heartbeat sends a request to itself (1.7) by an asynchronous method call 167 (by using !). Afterwards, the return value of the call is retrieved (l. 8, using 168 get). This blocks the process until the httpRequest process has terminated. 169 No other process can run on this object until this happens. If the request 170 was successful, beats is increased by 1. Method reset waits without blocking 171 until the number of success reaches a passed threshold and resets beats. 172 Synchronous calls are possible (l. 10) on this. 173

Specifications are annotations of the form [Spec: KIND(e)], where KIND is the used specification pattern. Fig. 1 gives an overview over the keywords for the specification patterns and where to annotate them. In the example, a creation condition and an object invariant are specified for the class Monitor. They state that the passed server must be non-null and stays nonnull throughout execution (l. 1). The method contract states that the beats field is increased. This is not the case, and we return to the fault in Sec. 5.

Example Local Session Types. Fig. 2 shows an example how the specifications work together when using local session types. The class C uses a protocol with three roles, that are declared in the class header using Role. Additionally, an object invariant is used to declare that all the fields are non-null. The

```
[Spec:Requires(this.s != null)][Spec:ObjInv(this.s != null)]
2 class Monitor(Server s) {
   Int beats = 0;
3
   [Spec:Ensures(this.beats >= old(this.beats) &&
4
5
                  result == this.beats)]
   Int heartbeat() {
6
    Fut<Int> req = s!httpRequest();
7
    Int status = req.get;
8
    if(status == 200) { this.beats = this.beats + 1;}
9
    else { this.handleError(); }
10
    return this.beats:
11
   }
12
   Unit reset(Int i){ await this.beats == i; this.beats = 0; }
13
   Unit handleError() { this.beats = 0; /* ... */ }
14
15 }
```

Listing 1: An example ABS program with specification.

sole shown method, getExpLocalAliasing, is using a type where as the first action the client is called on method a. The connection of the field this. c and the role client is established through the aforementioned class-level specification. The invariant is needed to show that no exception is thrown. The other actions specify a synchronization on the future stored in variable f and a termination without a specific post-condition.

## 191 2.4. Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution describes the execution of a program (or statement) 192 with symbolic values. A symbolic value is a placeholder and can be described 193 by condition collecting during the symbolic execution. Heavyweight sym-194 bolic execution is used as a *proof strategy* for a sequent calculus of first-order 195 dynamic logics in, e.g., JavaDL [1], ABSDL [32] or DTL [33] and has success-196 fully applied to discover highly involved bugs in non-concurrent libraries of 197 mainstream languages [2, 3]. One of the shortcomings of symbolic execution 198 with dynamic logics is that they first fully symbolically execute the program 199 and then evaluate the post-condition. For distributed systems the specifica-200 tion, however, often contains a temporal element and can be partially checked 201 already *during* symbolic execution. 202

<sup>203</sup> The Behavioral Program Logic (BPL) [18] is a generalization of dynamic

```
1 [Spec: Role("server", this.s)][Spec: Role("client", this.c)]
2 [Spec: Role("database", this.d)]
3 [Spec: ObjInv(this.s != null && this.c != null && this.d != null)]
4 class C(Server s, Client c, Database d) {
    [Spec:Local("client!a(true).Get(f).Put(true)")]
5
    Unit getExpLocalAliasing() {
6
      Fut<Int> f = this.c!a();
7
      Fut<Int> sth = f;
8
      Int a = sth.get;
9
    }
10
11 . . .
12 }
```

Figure 2: An example ABS program with a local session type.

logic. It uses *behavioral* modalities, which we informally introduce now, 204 to enable such symbolic execution strategies. BPL is based on behavioral 205 specifications  $\mathbb{T} = (\alpha_{\mathbb{T}}, \tau_{\mathbb{T}})$ . Set  $\tau_{\mathbb{T}}$  is the set of terms of the specification, 206 and function  $\alpha_{\mathbb{T}}$  provides the semantics: it maps elements of  $\tau_{\mathbb{T}}$  to trace 207 formulas. Behavioral specification are referred to in the logic using behavioral 208 modalities, which have the form  $[\mathbf{s} \Vdash^{\alpha_{\mathbb{T}}} \tau]$ , with  $\tau \in \tau_{\mathbb{T}}$  being a specification 209 term. Its semantics expresses partial correctness: a state  $\sigma$  satisfies the 210 modality, if every trace  $\theta$  of a normally terminating run of s from  $\sigma$  is a 211 model for the trace formula  $\alpha_{\mathbb{T}}(\tau)$ . We omit  $\alpha$  from examples for brevity. 212

A sequent has the form  $\Gamma \Rightarrow \{U\}[\mathbf{s} \Vdash^{\alpha} \tau], \Delta$ , where  $\Gamma$  and  $\Delta$  are two sets 213 of formulas, and represents a symbolic state, where s is the statement left to 214 symbolically execute, U is the state update (i.e., a syntactic representation 215 of accumulated substitutions [34]), and  $\tau$  is the specification term, e.g., the 216 post-condition, and  $\bigwedge \Gamma \land \neg \bigvee \Delta$  describes the accumulated knowledge and 217 path condition. An example rule for symbolic execution in sequent calculi 218 is the following rule, that expresses a split over the branches of a branching 219 statement for post-conditions  $\varphi$ . 220

$$\frac{\Gamma, \{U\}\mathbf{e} \Rightarrow \{U\}[\mathbf{s}_1 \Vdash \varphi], \Delta \qquad \Gamma, \{U\} \neg \mathbf{e} \Rightarrow \{U\}[\mathbf{s}_2 \Vdash \varphi], \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \{U\}[\mathbf{if}(\mathbf{e}) \ \mathbf{s}_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ \mathbf{s}_2 \Vdash \varphi], \Delta}$$

221

Behavioral specifications separate syntax of the specification  $(\tau)$  and its semantics as a trace specification  $(\alpha)$ . This distinction enables behavioral symbolic execution: the *design* of  $\tau$  can now aim to have a simple proof calculus that is not restricted by the structure of the logic underlying  $\alpha$ . Furthermore,  $\tau$  can serve as an interface to external analyses.

Established calculi for dynamic logics perform symbolic execution by reducing the statement inside a modality without considering the specification. In contrast, for each step in a behavioral type system [35], the statement is matched with the current specification. BPL combines both: a logical framework with a behavioral type-style calculus, which we call *guided SE*.

For example, the local session type given above is expressed with the 232 modality  $[\mathbf{s} \Vdash \mathbf{f!m.g!n.} \downarrow \mathbf{result} == 0]$ . One (slightly prettified) rule for 233 session types is the following. The first premise checks that the role and field 234 coincide, the second premise reduces the type during the symbolic execution 235 step. Note that this premise contains no modality – we call such branches 236 side-branches. We stress that the conclusion of the rule has to match (1) the 237 call in specification and statement and (2) the method names both syntacti-238 *cally.* If matching fails, SE stops. 239

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \{U\} \text{this.f} \doteq \mathbf{r}, \Delta \qquad \Gamma \Rightarrow \{U\} [\mathbf{s} \Vdash \mathbf{L}], \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \{U\} [\text{this.f!m();s} \Vdash \mathbf{r!m.L}], \Delta}$$

#### 241 3. Software Framework

240

At its core, **Crowbar** is a *heavyweight* symbolic execution (SE) engine, i.e., 242 it uses contracts and loop invariants to build a SE tree that abstracts from all 243 possible runs. As discussed the used program logic allows for *quided* SE: the 244 specification is used to guide the construction of the SE tree. Construction 245 may abort if there is not possible that any further execution may satisfy 246 the specification. For example, if the specification expresses that the first 247 interaction is a call to a method m, but the first call is to a method n, then 248 guided SE will immediately abort the proof. The leaves of the SE tree, after 249 SE successfully finished, are logical formulas that are passed to SMT-solvers. 250

Fig. 3 illustrates guided SE using our example for Session Types. The node marked with (1) is not generated, as the type system ensures that **this**. **f** is always non-**null** (due to being annotated with NonNull). The other dashed nodes are omitted because the method is specified to make two calls, but executes three. It does not check any steps after the second call as these are already following a wrong execution path. We omitted (a) the update, (b) the collected path condition and (c) the role check branches in the illustration.

| <pre>1 class C([NonNull]I f){ 2</pre> |  | $\varphi_{\pm}$   |                                |  |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|--------------------------------|--|
| 3                                     | [Spec: f!m.g!n. $\downarrow \varphi$ ] | return 0;⊩ź   | this.f != null                 |  |
| 4                                     | Unit m(){                              | <b>this</b> $f!m()$ : <b>return</b> $0$ : $\Vdash \downarrow \varphi$ | this.g != null                 |  |
| 5                                     | <pre>this.f!m();</pre>                 |   |                                |  |
| 6                                     | <pre>this.g!m();</pre>                 | this.g!m(); this.f!m(); return 0; $\Vdash$ g!n. $\downarrow \varphi$  |                                |  |
| 7                                     | <pre>this.f!m();</pre>                 |   |                                |  |
| 8                                     | <b>return</b> 0;                       | (1<br>  _   | ) this.f != null               |  |
| 9<br>10 }                             | }                                      | <pre>this.f!m(); this.g!m();<br/>this.f!m(); return 0;</pre>          | $f!m().g!n.\downarrow \varphi$ |  |

Figure 3: Illustration of guided SE. Verification of the method to the left results in a symbolic execution tree where the dashed nodes are not generated.

#### 258 3.1. Software Functionalities

Crowbar implements the three specification paradigms described in Sec. 2 and the assert statement for ABS: *object invariants* [36], predicates that have to hold at every point a process gains or loses control over its object, *cooperative contracts* [17], a generalization of method contracts to distributed systems, and *local Session Types* [37, 16, 15], a protocol language for allowed communication actions.

It generates proof obligations in BPL and has two additional mechanisms 265 to interact with the outside: (1) Counterexample Generation: If a proof obli-266 gation fails, all failed proof branches are translate back into an ABS program, 267 using the values extracted from the SMT solver proof attempt at the leaf. 268 This allows the user to investigate the failure without being exposed to the 269 underlying program logic. (2) Static Nodes: Cooperative Contracts and Ses-270 sion Types rely on additional mechanisms to guarantee safety of composition 271 (propagation for contracts and projection for Session Types). These mecha-272 nisms are external to the program logic and Crowbar, thus, outputs a *static* 273 *node* to communicate that the program is safe, if these external conditions 274 hold. 275

A verification attempt with Crowbar outputs either (1) yes, (2) yes with external condition or (3) no with counterexample (if generation succeeds).

Crowbar supports pre-/post-conditions for the functional sublanguage.
Crowbar also integrates results directly from the ABS compiler: the AST has
nullability annotations, and expressions are not checked for null-access if the
type system already ensures this.



Figure 4: Structure of Crowbar.

## 282 3.2. Software Architecture

283 Crowbar has a pipeline setup with front-end, middle-end and back-end, as
284 shown in Fig. 4.

Front-end. The front-end uses the ABS parser to generate an annotated AST and extracts, per method, one statement s and one specification term  $\tau$  for this method. The statement is translated into an internal representation (IR) to normalize the AST. For example, each call has a target variable. The specification term language depends on the specification mechanism chosen by the user. The front-end furthermore sets up a program repository to manage the specification and connects the IR with the original.

Middle-end. The middle-end implements SE using the chosen set of rules. When SE finishes, all leaves of the SE trees are either *static nodes*, discussed above, *logical nodes*, which are first-order formulas whose validity ensures that this branch is safe. Guided SE is realized by matching the current specification term on the current program and reducing *both* in one SE step.

Back-end. The back-end of Crowbar passes logical nodes to external SMT-297 LIB solvers. If all logical nodes can be proven to be valid, then the program is 298 considered safe up to external restrictions, which are output as static nodes. 299 If one of the logical nodes fails to be proven valid, Crowbar attempts to 300 construct a *counterexample program* [38] by extracting value from the coun-301 terexample model output by the SMT solver and reconstructing a minimal 302 runnable program directly from the path of the SE tree taken to this leaf. If 303 a SMT model is not available, counterexample generation fails. Generating 304 the SMT-LIB input requires the repository to ensure correct typing. 305

### 306 4. Implementation and Empirical Results

Implementation. Crowbar is implemented in Kotlin in 5500 lines of SLoC (ac-307 cording to cloc [39]), and a ANTLRv4 parser for local Session Types. The 308 build system is using gradle, the used testing framework is kotest. User man-309 ual and developer documentation on adding a new specification/verification 310 module is available in the github repository. We performed two evaluations: 311 For a performance evaluation, we use the  $absexamples^4$  repository, where 312 case studies and examples from the development of ABS are collected. We 313 have loaded all 647 methods which are fall into the CoreABS fragment and 314 used Crowbar to verify the default specification. As the default specification 315 is not meaningful, we additionally adopted two bigger examples to CoreABS 316 (WaterTank.abs, 60 LoC, chat.abs, 307 LoC), specified and verified that no 317 exceptions are thrown (and a simple functional invariant of the water tank: 318 water level never drops below 0). Benchmarking was run on a 8-core i7-8565U 319 CPU with 1.80GHz and 32GB RAM on a Ubuntu 20.04.5 laptop. On aver-320 age, 10 symbolic execution steps are performed (with 171 symbolic execution 321 steps for the biggest), which on average needs  $\sim 110ms$  (with 1650ms). 322

As Crowbar requires a fully specified program to return meaningful results, we performed the following case study for functional correctness for a qualitative evaluation.

Case Study. Crowbar is used in the biggest verification case study for Active
Objects [22]: A model extracted from C code [40] with 260 lines of ABS code,
with 5 classes (with invariants and creation conditions), 5 interfaces (with 19
method contracts) and 1 function with a contract. The verification succeeds
fully automatically. In contrast, the previously biggest case study [14] has
140 LoC for 1 class (with invariant) and requires manual interaction.

Coverage and Comparison with KeY-ABS. Crowbar covers full coreABS, i.e., ABS without its extensions for time or variability. Specification in Crowbar is purely in terms of the program, i.e., using expressions, using the specification patterns described in Sec. 2.

Table 1 gives the syntax for specifications and compares Crowbar and KeY-ABS with respect to language and specification coverage. Note that KeY-ABS does not support several statements of ABS, such as case, throw, try,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>https://github.com/abstools/absexamples

| Feature                         | Support              | Specification                              | KeY-ABS              | $SN^1$ |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|--|----------------------|--------|
| Asynchronous Contr.             | Yes                  | Requires, Ensures on methods in interfaces | Yes <sup>§</sup>     | No     |
| Synchronous Contr.              | Yes                  | Requires, Ensures on methods in classes    | No                   | Yes    |
| Cooperative Contr               | Ves                  | Succeeds, Overlaps on methods and await    | No                   | Ves    |
|                                 |                      | Resolves on get                            |                      |        |
| Object Invariants               | Yes                  | Requires, ObjInv on classes                | Yes <sup>†</sup>     | No     |
| Function Contracts              | Yes                  | Requires, Ensures on functions             | No                   | No     |
| Loop Invariants                 | Yes                  | WhileInv on loops                          | No                   | No     |
| Session Types                   | Partial <sup>a</sup> | Role on classes, Local on methods          | No                   | Yes    |
| old and last                    | Yes                  |  | No                   | -      |
| Counterexamples                 | Yes                  |  | No                   | -      |
| History Specification           | Partial <sup>b</sup> |  | Yes                  | -      |
| First-order logic Specification | No                   |  | Yes                  | -      |
| Exceptions and assert           | Yes                  |  | Partial <sup>‡</sup> | -      |
| Functions and ADTs              | Yes                  |  | No                   | -      |

<sup>a</sup> No passive choice and exceptions. <sup>b</sup> Can be partially encoded by hand. <sup>1</sup> SN =static nodes. <sup>§</sup> Encodable. <sup>†</sup> No creation condition. <sup>‡</sup> Only null access

Table 1: Overview over feature support in Crowbar for coreABS.

and **assert**.<sup>5</sup> For a detailed discussions on the limitations on the underlying ABSDL logic we refer to Kamburjan [31, Ch.2]. A further point worth mentioning is that KeY-ABS does not support specification within the program and takes it as additional input. In contrast, Crowbar supports all this and connects specification and program tightly by using annotations for specifications.

*Limitations.* Crowbar is limited to partial correctness of coreABS. Further-345 more, **Crowbar** does not support passive choice and exceptions in local types, 346 which are an open research question. Additionally, it does not support first-347 order specifications and specification of the history of events, which however 348 can be added manually by the user: Histories can be added by introducing 349 a special ADT for events and a field of list type in every class that managed 350 explicitly. Due to its design, Crowbar relie on the counterexample generation 351 to interact between user and proof, as it relies on an automatic SMT solver 352 for its backend. Additionally, Crowbar can output the symbolic execution 353 tree, as well as the concrete SMT-LIB output. 354

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>A reason for the limitations is that it reuses KeY-Java internally, which do not support, for example, functional structures, and encode assumptions that are valid for Java, but not ABS directly in the code. An example for the last point is that in ABS, classes cannot be extended, while Java supports code inheritance.



Figure 5: An example for counterexample generation with Crowbar.

Related Tools. We already discussed KeY-ABS in detail above. Chisel [41] is a tool for hybrid Active Objects that generates proof obligations in  $d\mathcal{L}$  [42], which in turn has three implementations as KeY-style symbolic execution engines [43] for a minimal hybrid programming language.

Outside the KeY-family, the Why3 [44] and Boogie [45] frameworks provide deductive verification middle-ends based on SE. Their separation of verification technique and programming language makes them not suited for our situation: we target a specific concurrency model with a *tight* coupling of specification and verification.

For Active Objects, Rebeca [46] supports model checking [47], which is 364 limited to bounded systems and supports no modular specifications. Re-365 garding deductive verification, KeY-ABS and Crowbar are the only systems 366 for Active Objects. For actors, there exists a proposed program logic by 367 Gordon [48] and a number of static analyses for Erlang, for which we refer to 368 an overview in the work of Bagherzadeh et al. [49]. Note, however, that pure 369 actors are not object-oriented, and that they do not implement cooperative 370 scheduling or futures. 371

#### 372 5. Illustrative Example

We give an example how to specify, verify and investigate a program and continue with the code specified in Lst. 1. The following attempts verifica375 tion:

## 376 > crowbar example.abs --method Module.Monitor.heartbeat -inv

The switch --method verifies a single method and requires its fully qual-377 ified name, in this case Module.Monitor.heartbeat. The proof attempt 378 fails: There is no contract given for handleError, so it is not specified how 370 the method changes the field heartbeat. The -inv flag activates the coun-380 terexample generator, which outputs the counterexample shown in Fig. 5. All 381 context interactions of the method (calls, suspension, synchronization, etc.) 382 are removed to ensure that it can be executed on its own. Furthermore, it 383 adds comments about extracted values and what interactions have been re-384 moved. Here, it shows that if the value of heartbeat was 21239 before and 385 handleError changes it to 21238, then a part of the post-condition does not 386 hold. The code is executable: as all context is removed, the programer may 387 now examine and manipulate the counterexample using standard debugging 388 techniques. 380

#### 390 6. Conclusion

*Impact.* Crowbar is an important step in the empirical research on analy-391 sis of Active Objects: it is the first verification tool to cover full coreABS 392 and implements novel specification and verification techniques in a flexible 393 framework that allows one to investigate further new approaches with little 394 overhead. In particular, we are now able to verify feature-rich programs, such 395 as the C extraction case study. For potential impact, Crowbar enables us to 396 tackle the numerous ABS case studies focusing on their specification without 397 modifying them to fit the very restricted fragment supported by prior tools. 398

Future Work. We plan to use Crowbar to implement novel heavyweight symbolic execution systems, in particular the probabilistic dynamic logic of Pardo et al. [50], for which development has started, and a concurrent setting for the dynamic logic for memory access patterns [51]. As for planned extensions, we plan to integrate delta-oriented verification [52] next, as well as integrate first-order specifications and automate the handling of histories.

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## 572 Required Metadata

## 573 Current code version

Ancillary data table required for subversion of the codebase. Kindly replace examples in right column with the correct information about your current code, and leave the left column as it is.

| Nr. | Code metadata description            | Please fill in this column         |
|-----|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| C1  | Current code version                 | v1.1.2                             |
| C2  | Permanent link to code/repository    | https://github.com/Edkamb/crowbar- |
|     | used for this code version           | tool/releases/tag/v1.1.2           |
| C3  | Permanent link to Reproducible       | doi.org/10.24433/CO.6726262.v1     |
|     | Capsule                              |                                    |
| C4  | Legal Code License                   | BSD-3-Clause                       |
| C5  | Code versioning system used          | git                                |
| C6  | Software code languages, tools, and  | Kotlin, gradle, antlr, github      |
|     | services used                        |                                    |
| C7  | Compilation requirements, operat-    | Z3, Java $\geq 1.11$               |
|     | ing environments & dependencies      |                                    |
| C8  | If available Link to developer docu- | https://github.com/Edkamb/crowbar- |
|     | mentation/manual                     | tool/wiki                          |
| C9  | Support email for questions          | eduard@ifi.uio.no                  |

Table 2: Code metadata (mandatory)